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PANEL DISCUSSION: THE IMPACT OF U.S.
TRADE LAW ACTIONS ON BUSINESS
DECISIONS IN TAIWAN
Panelists.
MH King, Chairman, China Steel Corporation;
K Casey Chuang, Chairman, Far Eastern Machinery Company;
W.S. Lin, President, Tatung Corporation;
Alvin H. Tong, Executive Vice President, Acer Incorporated
M.H. KING
In 1978, the deteriorating U.S. steel industry was unattractive to
investors because of global overproduction, rising ecological standards
and high labor costs. Unfortunately, the industry simultaneously
faced keen competition from foreign producers. To stem the tide,
many U.S. steel producers intensified their lobbying for protection
against imports which were blamed as the direct cause of the deterio-
ration of the steel industry.
At that time, the administrative and investigative procedures in
unfair trade investigations were long and complex, so that the com-
plainant generally had to wait thirteen months for any relief from the
pressure of the alleged dumping or subsidies against which he filed the
charges. The intensified lobbying led to the Solomon Report's recom-
mendation of a speedier remedy, the so-called "Trigger Price Mecha-
nism" ("TPM"), which automatically triggered an antidumping
investigation if the price of any steel import entering the U.S. after
April 30, 1978 was lower than a previously announced and periodi-
cally reviewed "Trigger Price." The TPM was the principal form of
U.S. steel industry trade protection between 1978 and October, 1984,
when the current Voluntary Restraint Agreement ("VRA") was
introduced.
China Steel's blast furnace and steel-making plant began producing
steel in July, 1977, shortly before the TPM was established. China
Steel's annual capacity at that time was 1.5 million tons. Its product
range was rather narrow, limited to heavy plate and long products.
Good product image had yet to be established. China Steel (CSC) did
not broaden its product line until 1981, when it began to produce thin
sheets and plate. Thus, early on, CSC focused on establishing a prod-
Panel US. Trade Law and Taiwan
uct image based on its limited product line and on putting its product
on the market as soon as possible. CSC was burdened by a lack of
competitiveness caused by its narrow product range. The company's
production planning and scheduling were in a stage of infancy. Prices
were determined by what the market in the consumer country (the
R.O.C., U.S.A., Japan, or Southeast Asia) would bear. Unfortunately,
the price set for the U.S. market was lower than the domestic price of
steel, although higher than the price of steel sold to the U.S. by other
countries.
Owing to lack of experience in production planning and schedul-
ing, CSC delayed shipment on about 8000 tons destined for the U.S.,
thus causing the steel to arrive after the date of commencement for the
trigger price mechanism. One may wonder whether CSC would have
been subject to investigation if it had made the shipments before the
deadline. In other words, under the pre-TPM procedures, would CSC
have been deemed to have been "injuring" the U.S. steel industry or
hindering new investment in the U.S. steel industry? It is hard to say.
The final result was that the case was heard by three members of the
International Trade Commission (out of a statutory membership of
six, only five seats of which were actually filled). The vote was taken
among only four members. A tied verdict (2-2) ruled that CSC had
been dumping, based on CSC's effect on the limited West Coast steel
plate industry.
What was the impact of this case on CSC's policy and practices?
The dumping case occurred before CSC reached maturity and CSC
was a victim of circumstances. However, it was a must for CSC to
grow into a mature world-class steel company in order for it to con-
tinue to exist. Even as it was selling and shipping the allegedly
dumped steel to the U.S., it was on its road to maturity. Whether the
dumping case had occurred or not, CSC was on the way to becoming a
world-class steel company. Based on the speaker's recollection of the
decisions made, it may be said that at most the impact on CSC's oper-
ating practices and policies was to accelerate the process of reaching
that goal.
Following the decision, there was a reduction in CSC's sales to the
U.S. and a shift toward the more high-end products, for which quality
differentiation took precedence over price differentiation. It is difficult
to conclude whether these decisions were the result of the dumping
case. Through competitive pricing in the domestic market, improved
after-sale service, and intensive efforts in the area of quality improve-
ment, CSC was able to command a larger share of the domestic mar-
ket. Less steel was available for export, and the allocation of steel for
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export to the U.S. naturally fell. This fact, coupled with the lower
freight for shipments to neighboring countries, encouraged CSC to
designate the product available for sale in neighboring markets.
What about the future? With the depreciated dollar and measures
adopted by the U.S. steel industry to make it more competitive and to
pull itself back into the black, I hope that the U.S. will become a free
market for foreign steels, without any impediments such as VRAs and
TPMs. At that time, CSC hopes there will be a stronger two-way
trade in steel with the U.S., for the R.O.C. today is among the most
open countries for steel imports. We hope the U.S. steel industry will
refrain from urging the U.S. government to put up protective barriers.
In addition to the above remarks, I have the following comments
on the U.S. trade law. I believe that some amendment is necessary to
make them compatible with the GATT, or more in conformance with
the principles of fairness to the respondent.
First, the GATT says that dumping duties should be only so high
as necessary to offset any injury caused by the dumped goods. How-
ever, under U.S. law, the full amount of the dumping margin is always
assessed against imports, even if the full margin much exceeds the
amount necessary to offset the injury. Many cases can be cited in
which dumping margins are far in excess of the underselling margins.
In this regard many scholars have held the opinion that collection of
dumping duties in the U.S. exceeds the amount envisioned by the
GATT.
Second, under U.S. law the Commerce Department does not offset
sales above fair value against those below fair value. For most product
lines, the price curve does not exactly follow the cost curve, and as a
result some items may be sold at prices above dumping levels and
others at prices below dumping levels. In these situations, the Com-
merce Department calculations will total up the dollar value attributa-
ble to dumping margins, but they will not offset that total dumping by
the corresponding amount by which other products are sold in the
U.S. at prices above fair value (i.e., non-dumping prices).
This situation has serious consequences. Every manufacturer in
the world makes different profit margins on different items in his prod-
uct line and it is the overall sales revenue which ultimately determines
profitability. The manufacturer cannot aim for the same level of profit
on every item in his line. The Commerce Department calculations,
however, ignore this commercial reality by failing to credit above-fair-
value sales as an offset against below-fair-value sales.
As a final point, I want to point out that in the dumping systems of
virtually every other country besides the U.S., it is possible for foreign
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respondents to reach settlements of dumping charges and thereby
avoid the huge expense and disruption of trade that accompanies a
dumping case. In the U.S., however, the rules for negotiated settle-
ments are so cumbersome that it is virtually impossible for any dump-
ing case to ever reach a negotiated settlement. In fact, the only
situations in which this has occurred were in cases involving steel and
semiconductors-both huge industries in which the macroeconomic
effects were widespread.
In most U.S. dumping cases, settlement is simply impossible. It is
not unusual for the legal fees for a single company in a dumping case
to exceed $250,000, and in complex cases the fees may well exceed
$750,000. In addition to the fees for the investigation, there are fees
for consultants of various types (economists, accountants, etc.) and
fees for annual administrative reviews.
The inability to settle dumping cases under U.S. law adds tremen-
dous "frictional" costs to trade, and creates uncertainty in the market-
place. Thus, a dumping case may be used simply as a form of
harassment, since the American petitioning industry is aware that a
negotiated settlement is impossible. This, in the opinion of the
speaker, is not fair to the respondent.
I will first introduce Dr. K.C. Chuang. Mr. Chuang is Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Far East Machinery Corporation.
He also serves as Chairman of Logitech and Cimtek, two companies
that he founded in 1974 and 1976. Dr. Chuang holds a doctor's de-
gree in materials engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and before he joined Far East Machinery in 1972, he had
worked with Bendix and IBM in the field of project engineering and
management. In addition to his executive duties, he is Executive Di-
rector of the Chinese National Federation of Industries and serves as
the chairman of the Taiwan Association of Machinery Industries, Chi-
nese Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the Taipei Chapter of the
Society of Manufacturing Engineers. And so, now I give you Dr.
Chuang.
DR. K.C. CHUANG
Thank you, Mr. King. Much of what I would like to discuss this
morning has been covered by Mr. McGowan, I so I would add only a
1. Editors' Note: Due to an extremely busy schedule, Thomas McGowan, of Kaplan, Rossin,
and Vecchi, Taipei, was unable to include his remarks from the Symposium before our publish-
ing deadline. We apologize for any confusion this causes our readers.
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few more points. I would like to talk to you about steel products and
machine tools - two fields in which I am engaged.
First of all, I would like to add a few details about how unfamiliar
the suppliers from Taiwan are with legal procedures. It was rather
ironic that the first case of antidumping against a Taiwan supplier ac-
tually was brought against China Steel, which is, in our opinion, the
most sophisticated supplier. As far as I know, it was one of the few
companies that managed to carry out the program to reduce the
dumping margin from thirty-four to zero percent in four years. Very
few other companies have managed to do so.
The second point that I want to raise addresses the direct relevance
of the dumping margin to the quantity of supply from Taiwan. I was
going to use a graph, but it does not show any relationships, so I
thought it was perhaps irrelevant. The most drastic change in the sup-
ply of steel from Taiwan to the United States took place during the
last two years, due to appreciation of NT (New Taiwan) dollars,
rather than the rate of the dumping margin. Again, this indicates that
the external economic condition is more important.
One very important point is that, in most cases, people really have
no market share in mind, so when they first sell to this country, they
just quote and then sell. Now, if they were hit with an accusation of
dumping, our experience shows that the true dumping then takes
place. In other words, if you have a cancellation of an order, then you
are stuck, and some steel products, like tubular goods, are very bulky
and costly to keep in stock. So, now you really have to dump the
goods, and you can either sell domestically very cheap, or you can
export to other countries. In the case of some steel products, like tu-
bular goods, the domestic specifications differ. We use ISO interna-
tional standards in Taiwan, whereas, in this country, the standard is
ASTM. Therefore, whatever we have intended for export would not
meet the specifications of our domestic market. Moreover, the ASTM
specifications are usually more demanding. In other words, it usually
would cost more. But to sell them in the domestic market, you get
only the domestic price, and therefore, it is true dumping. So, dump-
ing actually took place after we were accused of dumping, and not so
much before.
One more point that I want to bring up involves the computer
tape. Somehow, the Commerce Department has a different computer
system than ours. Practically none of our tape matches their machine,
and they say that it is not possible for them to convert the tape. The
tape is unusable, and it is therefore up to them to determine our con-
structed value.
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One more very important point is that we have very high hidden
costs in the domestic market. Additionally, in our typical distribution
system, we will be paid five to six months after shipment of goods.
Small firms cannot get financing from banks, so they have to rely on
private channels to actually cash the check, and they have to pay
sometimes as much as three percent per month interest. Moreover,
domestic sales are very vulnerable to delinquent payment, or even to
the bankruptcy of the purchaser. All this must be included in the do-
mestic sales prices. A typical export, on the other hand, involves little
credit risk. Because L/C provides the seller with cash right away,
there is a substantial difference between the costs of domestic sales and
the costs of exports. A cursory price comparison does not reveal these
differences, and is therefore illusory.
Another important observation, which Mr. McGowan did not ad-
dress (although he referred to it briefly) is what we call "cyclist entre-
preneurs," those who operate without profit, but only maintain cash
flow. They are willing to operate with no profit because the land of
their plant site appreciates in value much more than they could possi-
bly make from their business. Typical cyclists must simply keep on
pedaling, or else they fall, as they would fall off a bicycle.
In the steel business, cyclists are common. They hold on to a large
piece of land, and simply continue exporting at no profit. It is ironic
that, even at no profit, cyclists seldom are able to produce quality
goods for the domestic market; they are therefore very often export
oriented. When the Department of Commerce comes to investigate,
there are no domestic sales to use as comparisons. Absent such com-
parisons, the cyclists have a better chance of escaping the dumping
accusation. It is interesting that the people who do actually dump
seldom are accused of it.
The impact of antidumping actions can be very severe. In a case
involving pipe fittings, the dumping margin started at thirteen to
eighty percent, with twenty-nine percent to others. Four companies
were involved. After the investigation, the dumping margins were ac-
tually increased, ranging from 37 to 138 percent. This, of course, se-
verely damaged the industry and, according to the latest survey (the
finding was made only on September 21 of this year, but orders are
often cancelled while an investigation is taking place), the pipe-fitting
people say that they have decreased production from 4500 tons to 700
tons. The number of manufacturers has dwindled from twenty to only
five, with a reduction of employees from thousands to only about 600.
They expect that exports will amount to less than four percent of their
previous capacity, for a total of only about one million dollars.
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One more subject that I want to address is the Voluntary Restraint
Agreement (VRA) on machine tools. I am not familiar with the legal
aspects, so I do not know whether a VRA amounts to a trade law
enforcement mechanism. But it has had a very severe impact on the
machine tool industry in Taiwan. The VRAs hit us totally by sur-
prise, which we think was unfair. The Reagan Administration
targeted four countries for the VRAs in 1986. We were requested to
roll back our U.S. exports of six kinds of machine tools to our 1985
market share. Since Taiwan had a very small market share of two of
these six items, we were asked to sign VRAs on four items.
This morning, someone asked our Vice-Minister how Japan, Korea
and Taiwan are different. I would like to take this opportunity to
point out that Taiwan has no formal diplomatic relationship with the
U.S. In that sense, I think we are very often discriminated against, in
comparison with the other two countries. The so-called VRAs pro-
vide a good example. The USTR handed us a draft of the arrange-
ment and, from the very first meeting, threatened us with unilateral
quotas if we did not agree to the arrangement. In Taiwan, we call
these "involuntary restraint agreements," for they cannot be said to be
voluntary. When the second negotiation took place in Tokyo (Wash-
ington, D.C. was the location of the first negotiation) we were so close
to the deadline that we had to sign. We tried to persuade the USTR
people to give us the same treatment as the other three countries -
Germany, Switzerland, and Japan - but we were unsuccessful. Later
we discovered that only Japan and Taiwan signed the agreement.
Germany and Switzerland threatened to sue, and were ultimately able
simply to ignore the U.S. One thing we found out after we signed the
agreement was that, at the time of negotiations and signing, the U.S.
government did not really have the authority to impose a unilateral
quota or import restriction without signing a VRA first. I think it is
unfortunate that our people were not adequately aware of the applica-
ble law. When Congress finally provided the Executive with authority
to impose unilateral quotas, we had already signed the VRA and thus
could no longer object to the threatened quotas.
Throughout the discussions, we argued that Taiwan produced rela-
tively low-cost machine tools, did not take jobs away from the Ameri-
can manufacturers, and actually supplemented, rather than competed
against, U.S. manufacturers. We therefore presented no threat to the
national security of the United States. Of course, the U.S. insisted that
Taiwan had tremendous potential, and argued that if it allowed Tai-
wan to grow at that pace, Taiwan would eventually replace Japan as
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the main supplier of imported machine tools to the United States.
They therefore insisted on targeting Taiwan for a VRA.
One issue that could have been very important is the subject that
Mr. King discussed - intellectual property. Several Taiwanese
machine tool manufacturers had to copy U.S. brands. Actually, this
does not amount to counterfeiting in the intellectual property sense,
because machine components are not consumer items. But the manu-
facturers can make machines identical to the U.S. machines to the ex-
tent that even the parts are replaceable. In other products, you would
call that "second sources." As used by these manufacturers, it is not
an illegal second source. In the automotive industry, there are after-
market replacement parts. As I know, a manufacturer can legally pro-
duce the parts that are compatible with the original parts. In the
machine tools industry, however, this practice is resented by U.S.
manufacturers. Thus, we suspect that one of the reasons that the U.S.
was so forceful about the VRA on machine tools was due to the hostil-
ity on the part of the U.S. Machine Tool Association towards some
Taiwan manufacturers.
The impact, of course, is very substantial because, in 1986, we were
confident enough to sell some of the more sophisticated computer-con-
trolled machine tools to the U.S. The statistics showed that we would
double our market share in the U.S. in 1986. The VRA prevented
this, however, by requiring us to roll back to our 1985 market share.
Our main competition, of course, was Japan, and no statistics reveal
an increase in market share as far as the Japanese are concerned be-
tween 1985 and 1986. Once again, the Japanese were found to be very
well prepared for this VRA, which was under consideration for three
years before Reagan finally announced it. At that time, we had never
dreamed of Taiwan being a target country for a VRA.on machine
tools. In fact, when the U.S. announced that Taiwan was a target
country, we felt very flattered for being recognized as a supplier of
capital equipment rather than just consumer goods. However, the im-
pact of the VRA on Taiwan's industry is very severe, because machine
tools are Taiwan's main growth items both in terms of technology and
market share.
After the VRA, of course, some companies tried to jump the gun,
and they severely suffered as a result. One company's shipment of a
large quantity of poorly-prepared machining centers resulted in its be-
ing left with a tremendous amount of stock in the United States. In-
deed, as far as I know, even today - three years after we entered the
VRA arrangement - the company still has 1986 stock. The company
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erred both by failing to construct its machines properly, and by falsely
anticipating a shortage that would result from the VRA.
As a result of the VRA, we have been forced to diversify our mar-
ket. We have been particularly successful in selling to Europe, where
our exports have doubled. The market share of our exports to the U.S.
has been reduced from about fifty percent of our exports of machine
tools to twenty-six percent. In a sense, the VRA is a blessing in dis-
guise because it forced us to look toward the European market, which,
by demanding higher quality, has forced us to produce goods of higher
quality. We have been rather successful in doing just that.
One matter that concerned us about the VRA was our expectation
that, whatever market share we surrendered (supposedly to the U.S.
manufacturers) would ultimately be absorbed by non-VRA countries.
This is what actually happened. We protested many times that we
wanted the U.S. to check other non-VRA countries, but the U.S. re-
sponded that their intention was to hold import market share con-
stant; they did not care 'which particular country's market share
increased or decreased. In terms of competition, however, we are very
concerned about certain countries' increasing market share. For in-
stance, Mr. McGowan talked about Korea; we are very concerned that
Koreans are increasing their U.S. market share. We believe that our
main competitor in the future will be Korea.
The VRA is now coming up for review, and we are hoping that the
U.S. government can be realistic. Mr. Reagan asked for the VRA on
the basis of national security rather than the protection of U.S. indus-
try. It is claimed that the U.S. has to be "war-ready," which means
that it should have enough journeymen (e.g., tradespeople and
craftsmen) available in the event of a war. They say that they do not
really care who makes the machine, as long as the machines are made
in the United States. Japanese companies have therefore begun manu-
facturing machine tools in this country. Now the U.S.-based compa-
nies are continuing to lose ground. I was in Bridgeport yesterday, and
I saw many large plants being closed, and some others in the process
of going down the drain. Regardless of intentions, the result of the
VRA has been protectionist. In our opinion, Taiwan is being hurt,
while U.S. industry is not really being benefited. We hope that this
will end.
As a concluding remark, at a time when the Berlin wall is being
torn down, we hope the U.S. will be more realistic about the VRA on
Taiwan-made machine tools as a national security issue. We hope the
U.S. will stop tormenting her most loyal and obedient friends in
Taiwan.
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Thank you.
M.H. KING
Next, I wish to call on Mr. W.S. Lin. Mr. Lin is President of the
Tatung Company. He is trained in both business and science, and has
a bachelor of science in electrical engineering from the Tatung Insti-
tute of Technology, and an MBA degree from Washington University
in St. Louis. He also serves as a Director on the Consultative Council
for Electronics Industries. The principal business of his company, of
course, is the manufacture and distribution of home appliances, elec-
tronics, and industrial equipment. The company is one of Taiwan's
leading export firms in terms of volume and value. And so, I offer you
now Mr. W.S. Lin.
W.S. LIN
On behalf of the Taiwanese TV manufacturers, I would like to dis-
cuss some of our experiences and opinions with regard to proceedings
under U.S. trade law.
Tatung Company has been involved in a color television ("CTV")
Antidumping Administrative Review since 1983. Our experience dur-
ing the past few years indicates that U.S. trade law practices have been
complicated and unfair to the exporters' operations, and that U.S. cus-
tomers might have suffered a great economic loss. After all, U.S. trade
law has had no positive effect on either the exporter or the U.S. indus-
try. On the contrary, it has created a number of negative effects.
First of all, U.S. customers lost their opportunity to select more
brands at lower prices. The reason is that under U.S. antidumping
law, the primary criterion in determining the dumping margin is the
following formula:
Dumping Margin Rate = (Home market net price - U.S. net price)
U.S. net price
Therefore, either a reduction in the home market price or an increase
in the U.S. market price can eliminate the dumping margin. If we
increase U.S. prices, however, U.S. customers will definitely lose their
chance to buy inexpensive products. In fact, we have little difficulty in
doing this, since the Taiwanese market is now more widely open to
foreign products and is gradually becoming internationalized. Surely,
the dumping margin will be less and less as time goes by.
Secondly, the original function of the U.S. antidumping law was to
preserve more jobs for U.S. labor and maintain a considerable market
for U.S. industry. The result has not been as expected. According to
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the above-mentioned formula, if we reduce prices in the home market,
then the dumping margin will be eliminated, and the U.S. market will
not be changed. How can the labor union or the CTV industry of the
U.S. improve itself by issuing an antidumping petition? Therefore, if
the exporters adjust both their home market prices and U.S. prices,
then the result will be harmful to the U.S. customers and will not
benefit the industry or labor at all.
Thirdly, a U.S. antidumping proceeding could badly affect the
flotation of U.S. market prices. Once the exporters' home market
changes, for example, exporters will adjust their U.S. market prices at
such time in order to avoid a dumping violation. Numerous exporters
from different areas export their televisions to the United States. If
exporters from any area have changed their home market price for any
reason, the U.S. antidumping law has forced them to consider price
changes in the U.S. market as well.
Fourthly, the U.S. antidumping proceeding forced us to select new
geographic markets. Tatung, for example, established Tatung, Ltd. in
the United Kingdom, where CTVs are manufactured to supply the
European market..
We have also diversified our products exported to the U.S. market.
The CTV sales ratio, for instance, is not as high as it was before the
antidumping duty was levied. I believe that involvement in a U.S.
antidumping law proceeding will influence our determination whether
to invest in a manufacturing capacity overseas.
We have been doing well by ourselves in shaping our response to
the existing proceeding without any further government involvement.
Meanwhile, we try to do everything we can to avoid any other
dumping involvement.
We hope the U.S. petitioner of the Antidumping Administrative
Review stops its action and pays more attention to the improvement of
its production capabilities rather than complain of others' product
prices. Frankly speaking, we have no intention of selling our products
without fair profits. Certainly, if we can sell our products at a price
which is as high as that of the U.S. industry, we would be pleased to
have such a profitable price. The price of the product, however, is not
controlled by us. Rather, it is decided by the market.
Fifthly, I would like to point out that the purpose of the U.S.
antidumping law is to eliminate unfair trade competition. Yet, the
calculation of the dumping margin is unfair because the Commerce
Department's regulation does not consider the actual market situation.
First, the Commerce Department disregards- the N.T. dollar
appreciation which can have the effect of creating a high dumping
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margin. Second, the regulation does not allow a negative margin to
offset a positive margin; therefore, the calculation methodology is
unfair and incorrect.
Suppose we have two CTV models in the U.S. market: one model
is popular and sells at more than fair value; the other is going to be
phased out and is sold at less than fair value. From the business point
of view, we look at our CTV market as a whole rather than
segregating some models as profitable and others as unprofitable.
Besides, we need to phase out the old models in order to revitalize our
CTV market. It is easy to understand why phase-out models are
always sold at lower prices. Unfortunately, if we do so, we violate U.S
trade law.
Finally, we suggest that the U.S. authorities review these unfair
criteria. In the meantime, we hope the Commerce Department will
expedite all those antidumping proceedings which have long been
delayed. Up until now, the Commerce Department has only
announced the result of the First Review (1983-85) and the Second
Review (1985-86). We have finished our responses to the Third
Review (1986-87), the Fourth Review (1987-88) and the Fifth Review
(1988-89), but the Commerce Department has unreasonably
postponed the announcement of these review results. The long delay
in the announcement of the antidumping review has caused us a lot of
damage in the U.S. market and goes against the purpose of the
antidumping law. Because we did not know how much dumping duty
we had to pay, we could not calculate our costs or the so-called "fair
value measurements" required by U.S. antidumping law.
M.H. KING
Thank you, Mr. Lin. Next, we have Mr. Alvin Tong who is the
Executive Vice President of Acer, Incorporated, Taiwan. He serves as
the President of the New Business Development and Acer Ventures,
Incorporated, which is a subsidiary of Acer, Incorporated, in Taiwan.
He holds a doctoral degree and a master's of science in electrical engi-
neering from the University of Minnesota. After he obtained his Ph.D
in 1967, he spent thirteen years with IBM Corporation, working as an
engineer and holding various management positions. After returning
to Taiwan and prior to joining Acer in 1988, he held executive posi-
tions with such companies as Eastern Engineering, Asia Chemical
Corporation, and New Development Corporation. I think he's well
qualified to speak on the issue of computers, particularly with respect
to the issue of Intellectual Property Protection. I give you Mr. Alvin
Tong.
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A. TONG
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before I start, I have to
confess one thing to you. When our leader, Mr. King, assembled the
three-member panel for you today, he had three people in mind - two
excellent, outstanding young men have just spoken. The third one -
yet another outstanding young man - was supposed to be Mr. Stan
Shih, the Chairman and CEO of Acer, Inc., namely, my boss. Unfor-
tunately, Stan's schedule didn't allow him to come to this part of the
world, so I was Mr. King's second choice, and therefore, I will speak
from the second-choice point of view. Another minor correction is
that I joined Acer three and a half years ago. At the time it was called
Multi-tech. We changed the name in 1988.
My presentation will be different in flavor from the ones that have
been presented to you. Mine is more concentrated - entirely concen-
trated - on patents, copyrights, and trademarks. I speak here about
these things very nervously because, by trade, I am an electrical engi-
neer and do product design and sales and marketing. My good friend,
Paul Hsu, my schoolmate from both high school and university, will
hopefully bail me out if you have questions.
I will have four sections: a brief introduction; an update on the
status of intellectual property rights (IPR) in Taiwan; then I'll tell you
what I know best-the Acer experience in this respect; and I'll follow
with a brief conclusion.
The introduction is focused on the Acer experience in the informa-
tion industry. I'm not talking about the IPR in general.
THE STATUS OF THE IPR IN TAIWAN
The macroenvironment is not very respectable. We have a bad im-
age. I know, Dr. Chuang, that M.I.T., the school that you attended, is
excellent. M.I.T. in Taiwan is getting better. We have global pres-
sures, particularly from the United States. The laws - the IPRs -
are relatively new in Taiwan, and the law enforcement agencies are
very inexperienced. The urgency about the IPR protection is shared
by government officials as well as industrial leaders, but it is only now
slowly spreading to other levels.
However, much effort is expended in this area. There have been
many revisions and updates of copyright, trademark, and patent laws.
We're even introducing an Integrated Circuit Protection Act, which is
probably on the floor of the legislature as we speak.
Numerous agencies, organizations, and task forces now exist to co-
ordinate these laws and enforce them. One of the primary agencies is
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the IPR Policy Coordination Committee, chaired by Vice Chairman of
CEPD, Vincent Siew. The Committee consists of five ministry-level
people out of eight, representatives of both the provincial government
and the city government, as well as others.
The Anti-Counterfeiting Committee, organized under the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, is one of the most powerful Committees. The
Coordination Subcommittee for the Elimination of Copyright In-
fringement, acting under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, is
another powerful Committee whose activities have increased tremen-
dously since it started in 1985.
The Joint Inspection Task Force to Suppress Illegal MTV Opera-
tions is a very new task force which started in May, 1989. An IPR
enforcement task force has also been created by the National Police
Administration to work with both the Ministry of Interior and the
MOEA to enforce the IPR laws. Our judicial system also plays an
important role in IPR enforcement with both the Ministry of Justice
and the Judicial Yuan taking active roles.
Private organizations also exist to enforce the IPR laws. The oldest
one is the National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee, organized in 1984
by the ROC National Federation of Industries. With some guidance
and new funding from the MOEA, the Committee is currently being
expanded into what will be called the National IPR Protection Com-
mittee of the ROC.
The Taipei Computer Association has also been a superior force in
the anti-counterfeiting actions. It has recenttly formed a computer
product registration system. The newest system is called BIPA-the
Brand Name International Promotion Association-and this also in-
volves our chairman and CEO, Stan. It started in June, 1989.
PROGRESS REPORT
How are we doing? There are some improvements. The record
demonstrates a significant decrease in counterfeit goods. Agencies
have increased their activities in suppressing illegal activities. Manu-
facturers are much more aware now of the protection afforded by IPR,
and we have many campaigns on anti-counterfeiting activities. We
have an "Anti-Counterfeiting Week," anti-counterfeiting programs on
all three television channels, and similar educational programs in the
schools. A "Trademark and Patent Information Center" has also
been established.
That is a quick update of what is going on now in Taiwan. Be-
cause of these intense efforts to publicize IPR in Taiwan, there are
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probably more people in Taiwan who are aware of IPR protection
than in the United States.
THE ACER EXPERIENCE
Acer started in 1976 with eleven employees, five co-founders and
$25,000 (U.S.) in funding. In the last thirteen years, it has grown into
a complete PC company. Acer has its own R&D, manufacturing,
sales/marketing, and trading divisions, as well as educational and pub-
lishing operations. It is also an international operation which spans
the globe. At the end of 1988, Acer had over five thousand employees,
a substantial increase from the eleven employees of the company in
1976. Revenue in 1988 was approximately $500 million (U.S.).
Growth over the past five years has averaged approximately eighty-
eight percent per year. Return on equity has also been very positive.
Overall, for the last ten years, growth was approximately 100 percent
per year. We now have a whole line of PCs, as well as peripherals,
including monitors, keyboards, printers, and power supplies.
Our Research and Development (R&D) reaches across the Pacific,
operating both in Taiwan and in the Silicon Valley, employing about
seven hundred people. We spend about five to six percent of our reve-
nue in R&D.
Through distributors, we sell in seventy-eight countries. Approxi-
mately one-third of our market is in the U.S., one-third in Europe, and
one-third in the rest of the world. Ten percent of the market is in
Taiwan; ninety percent is exported. Our target for this year is about
three-quarters of a billion dollars in sales, and in 1990, we would like
to be a one billion dollar company. In 1991, 'Acer hopes to be one of
the top five PC suppliers in the world.
THE ACER EXPERIENCE WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The first experience involving intellectual property rights is the
Apple II Case. The case arose in 1982, when very few people in Tai-
wan understood software or bios copyright. Acer (Multi-tech at the
time) had shipped some Apple II compatible products to the U.S. The
shipment was quickly discontinued when concerns arose about a bios
copyright. We have since wanted to use this case as an educational
tool for Taiwan, so we used ourselves as the example. We hired U.S.
lawyers to come to Taiwan to conduct seminars for industries, for en-
gineers, for professors, and, in some cases I believe, for legal counsel
about the copyright in software and, in particular, bios. We thought
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that by paying the expense for seminars, other people might avoid hav-
ing to pay greater prices in the future.
Acer's second experience with intellectual property rights involved
the copyright law for computer software. This happened during 1984
or 1985. The legislative yuan (the equivalent of the U.S. Congress)
had only addressed the issue once. It normally takes three reads to
pass a law in the yuan. The copyright law originally dealt only with
music, tapes, books, and so forth, but not with computer software. So,
with Stan and a variety of counselers (I think Paul Hsu here was prob-
ably one of them), originally formed this great group of people to start
lobbying the legislative yuan, because they did not think the proposed
copyright law could adequately represent the computer software in-
dustry. They actually hired people. They invited foreign companies,
such as IBM. They hired lawyers. They also studied the copyright
law of the U.S. and Europe. I believe they spent six months at work
before they arrived at a very detailed proposal. The group then
presented the new proposal to the legislators and, eventually, the new
proposal on the software copyright law was passed without amend-
ment. This case is yet another example of efforts by the public, with
Acer's involvement, to try to establish a law that is suitable for com-
puter software as well as other products subject to intellectual prop-
erty laws. I believe this was probably the only instance in our country
in which a law was read once, and was then completely changed.
In 1987, before we started to develop the IBM PS-2 compatible
computers, we brought lawyers to Taiwan to help us set up the "clean
room procedures" to make sure that we would not do anything which
would infringe upon their bios. The licensing agreement was one that
many companies in Taiwan sign with IBM; we pay royalties for the
use of their patent rights.
Internally, Acer has held many seminars for all levels of people -
managers, engineers, operators - about IPRs. "Clean room" proce-
dures are strictly enforced for our programmers. The "clean room"
procedure, for those of you who are not familiar with the term, is a
procedure to help the software developers avoid contamination, thus
insuring that they will not infringe upon other people's software. We
also have patent incentive programs. It is very interesting to note that
our engineers would often rather work than file patents. They are
slowly learning to appreciate how important this filing procedure can
be to the company. I worked for IBM for thirteen years in the U.S.
and we were just crazy about filing patents for whatever we did. At
Acer, we still have to twist the arms of our engineers to file a patent.
So, we have lots of incentive programs for them, and those incentive
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programs, of course, include money. The amount of money is about
five times as much as what IBM paid us years ago, and we still can't
get them to file. Still, that's one area where we are trying very hard to
change. We also have IPR protection procedures within our com-
pany, including such things as a clean-desk policy, so as not to be
infringed upon by others. All of these activities are intended to estab-
lish our own patent portfolio so that we can eventually negotiate and
have cross-licensing with famous companies around the world.
The Brand Name International Promotion Association I men-
tioned earlier was recently formed by fifteen to twenty other industrial
leaders, including Stan, to promote Taiwan's brand names. This pro-
motional campaign is for all industries, not just for the information
industry. Stan chairs this association. Just before I left Taiwan, I
spoke to two other influential institutions in Taiwan. The first is "III"
(Institute for Information Industry), which is responsible as a govern-
ment agency, for the software development. The second is "ITRI"
(Industrial Technology Research Institute), which is also a govern-
ment institution responsible for hardware development in Taiwan.
Acer is a third such entity, and the three of us initiated this "club
type" association. We would like to promote intellectual property
rights in this type of atmosphere throughout the information industry
to promote our goals. We feel the time is right to do this now.
CONCLUSION
Due to pressure from the U.S., we actually have stricter laws than
you do in this country. There are imprisonment penalties if you in-
fringe copyrights. I think we are more conscious than many other
countries in terms of the IPRs, and we are now actively trying to es-
tablish patent portfolios. To be competitive, everyone needs to cut
costs. Since we have to pay license or royalty fees for the use of others'
patents, we are more conscious about cost reduction in every respect
of the operation. In the process, it makes us more competitive, and it
becomes a blessing in disguise even though we are spending more
money to develop our products.
I came to this country Monday, to San Francisco, and I read an
article in the San Jose Mercury News. It was written by Tom Peters.
I'm sure many of you have heard of him, especially in business school.
Tom Peters is the author or co-author of many books. I can remem-
ber at least three: In Search of Excellence, A Passion for Excellence,
and Thriving on Chaos. He wrote the article after a ten-day visit to the
Orient that included three of the four dragons-that is, Korea, Tai-
wan, and Hong Kong. The title of his article is "The Four Dragons
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Are Vibrant with Energy." In the article he described how impressed
he was with the three countries. He also gave a talk in Taiwan where
we all listened with great interest and admiration. He said he met a
New York executive who often travelled between Taiwan and New
York. The executive told him that every time he gets back to New
York City, he finds Manhattan a sleeping city. In the article, he spe-
cifically mentioned Hyundai in Korea, and Acer in Taiwan. He called
Stan Shih the "Steve Jobs of Asia." He concluded the article by say-
ing that compared to the four dragons, San Francisco and the Silicon
Valley were like "ghost-towns." You don't have to believe him, but if
you have not visited that part of the world-the Pacific Rim of the
Four Dragons-I think it's time that you did. I remember when I was
here many years ago, we kept talking about how "the Russians are
coming." The Russians have not come yet, but look out, America, the
Asians sure are!
Thank you very much.
M.H. KING
Thank you, Mr. Tong. At this point, I think it is in order for the
moderator to make some summarizing remarks from what I have just
heard. Undoubtedly, the three gentlemen that we have here today
represent the leaders of their respective industries. So, I think what
they say can be regarded as representative of each of their respective
industries.
In Mr. Lin's and Mr. Chuang's remarks, I cannot help but detect a
sense of bitterness and also a call for fairness in the treatment of re-
spondents who are charged with dumping. I think the origin of that
bitterness may be that we feel that some of the measures taken are not
for equalizing the unfairness, for redressing the unfairness, but are
more or less overkills, designed only to punish. We can even say that
they smack of protectionism. The makers of law and the petitioners in
their own right have the right to feel that the measures are fair and
proper. But the people who are called on the carpet do not seem to
feel so, and I think there is much room for communication and an
exchange of ideas on both sides. I think maybe a session-sympo-
sium-similar to this one on the whys and wherefores of the rules and
practices, as well as the feelings of the people who are affected by such
antidumping and CVD actions, may be in order. Perhaps this is a
project for some of you, or maybe the two programs which sponsored
this conference, to have other symposia that can serve this purpose.
Earlier this morning, we heard the remark that this symposium is
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focused on the impact of trade laws on the business decisions of two
east Asian countries. It would be certainly interesting - if this has
not already been done - to have a symposium on the impact of the
trade law actions on the petitioners. Have they actually benefited? As
I remember, the two conditions for levying antidumping duties are,
first, that goods are sold at less than fair value, and second, that their
sale has injured or prevented an industry from being established.
Well, after the action has been taken, did they recover? Was the re-
covery due to the action taken? Was the revival of the United States
steel industry because China Steel was found to be dumping, or did it
occur because they did something for themselves? These are questions
which I suggest can be subjects of further studies.
Regarding the IPR issue, I think, from Mr. Tong's remarks, we
can definitely say that within the conscience of the people of Taiwan,
we feel that violations are acts of theft and stealing. By Chinese--or
by any-moral standards, this should be curtailed and stopped, and
the laws that we have set up for the protection of intellectual property
rights must be enforced.
There is a difference in the attitude of the press and mass media
regarding the U.S. trade laws as they apply to manufacturing indus-
tries and those industries involving IPR. They tend to criticize the
retaliatory, punitive, and rather inflexible ways of treating antidump-
ing and countervailing duty cases. In the case of IPR, they tend to be
in favor of strict enforcement of IPR regulations, which should also
benefit the authors, composers, software writers and inventors of Tai-
wan itself. Although this may cause a rise in the price of goods involv-
ing IPR, it should become acceptable as income rises among the
people.
Thank you.
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